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Applying the Concept of Pain 
Abstract. This paper reaches the conclusion that, while there are ordinary cases in 
which the pretending to be in pain possibility is reasonable, these cases always 
contain some element that makes the pretending possibility reasonable. This will be 
the element that we ask for when we ask why the possibility is raised. Knowledge 
that someone else is in pain is a matter of eliminating the proposed element or 
neutralizing its pain-negating aspect. 
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I. Introduction 
In his reply to Gassendi, Descartes writes: "Finally, since you often demand 
an argument from me when you 0 flesh, possess none yourself, and since 
the 'onus' of the proof presses on you, we must note that in philosophizing 
correctly, there is no need for us to prove the falsity of all those things which 
we do not admit because we do not know whether they are true. We have 
merely to take the greatest care not to admit as true what we cannot prove 
to be true." (Descartes 1967,2: 209). Against this approach to philosophy, 
Charles Sanders Pierce writes: 
We cannot begin with complete doubt. We must begin with all the prejudices which 
we actually have when we enter upon the study of philosophy. These prejudices are 
not to be dispelled by a maxim, for they are the things which it does not occur to us 
can be questioned. Hence this initial skepticism will be mere self-deception, and not 
real doubt; and no one who follows the Cartesian method will ever be satisfied until 
he has recovered all those beliefs which in form he has given up. ... Let us not pretend 
to doubt in philosophy what we do not doubt in our hearts. (pierce 1966, p. 40) 
In the same spirit Charles L. Stevenson writes: 
it is typical of the Cartesian approach [to philosophy] to reverse our modem sense of 
justice, and to hold that all our ideas are guilty until proven innocent. ... Most of us 
have come to distrust this procedure. We have learned that the initial proofofinnocence 
has been hard to find.... I see only one way out of this difficulty - that of dropping the 
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Cartesian approach altogether and of holding our idea innocent until proven gUilty. I 
say this not to propound a categorical imperative, but to make an ordinary proposal­
a proposal which simply emphasizes in philosophy a procedure that we have long taken 
for granted in science and in daily life. (Stevenson 1947, pp. 4-5) 
This is reinforced in John Austin's "Other Minds." There Austin begins with 
a claim to know: "That is a goldfinch" (Austin 1970, p. 125). He takes this 
to be "a statement of particular, current, empirical fact ... the sort of 
statement on making which we are liable to be asked 'How do you know?''' 
(ibid.). Austin tells us about the many ways we could show we know (the 
keeper reported it, from the booming sound, and so on) and about the many 
ways in which our claim could be challenged (,Is that the right shade?' 'But 
goldfinches don't have that color', and so on) and about the many ways in 
which our claim could not be reasonably challenged (for example, ordinarily 
we need not rule out that it is stuffed). We must, Pierce, Stevenson, and 
Austin point out, have some positive reason for doubt; we do not doubt just 
on account of the Cartesian maxim. In this essay I shall apply this basic idea 
to the question of how we know somebody else is in pain. 
II. A Dialogue 
Let us imagine a philosophical dialogue about knowing that someone is in 
pain. The dialogue is about a man hit by a truck. Let the skeptic be S, and 
let M be a philosopher who is not a skeptic. 
S. 	 The man might be only pretending. 
M. What do you mean pretending-a truck hit him and his arm is broken. 
S. 	 Well, it is possible that he is not in pain and is only pretending. 
M. But how could he not be in pain? 
S. 	 Having a broken arm does not guarantee that you are in pain. Of course, 
it looks like he is in pain. But is he really? How can you know he is? 
M. Look, Jet's just move off and then spy on him and see if he continues 
to groan. 
S. 	 That won't show anything. Even if he continued to groan that might 
be because he was suspicious of someone spying on him. Or he might 
be afraid of someone coming along and catching him relaxing. 
M. 	Well look, suppose we go over to him and ask him and then closely 
examine him and then go into his past history and then set someone 
to watch him for the next two weeks. 
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S. 	 But that will not do. Even if all that meshed with the hypothesis that 
he was in pain, he still might not have been in pain. For all we can 
tell he may be one of those people who never feel pain. 
M. 	Now we have you. Because we can tell about that. Why else would 
he be groaning? 
S. 	 Who knows? Maybe he doesn't want anyone to know that he never 
feels pain. 
M. 	But we could check him out. We could talk to his parents who knew 
him as an infant when he could not pretend. 
S. 	 But what ifhe always behaved in the right ways-say because of a 
special physiological adjustment-and thus never seemed to be 
abnormal. 
M. Well, an examination of his nervous system would reveal this. 
S. 	 Surely it is possible for someone to have a normal nervous system 
and yet never feel pain. 
S begins with the remark that the man might only be pretending. M replies 
by citing some of his obvious behavior and circumstances. S replies that he 
may be putting that behavior on and not be in pain. We then move off and 
observe the man unnoticed. Still, pretense is possible. We trace the man's 
history. He still might be pretending. Let us call circumstances that could 
indicate that the person behaving in the ways criterially associated with pain 
was not in pain countervailing conditions. At no point does S cite any 
countervailing condition (for example, a wink) for thinking that the man is 
not in pain. There is no reason for thinking this. All S is telling us is that for 
all we can tell the man might not be in pain. S tells us this in a limited number 
of ways, for example, he might be pretending. She uses this limited number 
of ways over and over again. S sees M as the one obliged to give reasons. 
III Probability 
We cannot settle the possibility that a person is not in pain by saying that it 
is highly improbable. 
One might agree with S that it is always possible that the person 
displaying pain behavior is not in pain. But, it might be claimed, M could 
have replied to S that this possibility is highly unlikely. Thus we will still 
say we know even when we have not ruled it out because what we claim is 
very likely true. 
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This rather plausible sounding view will not work. This is not because 
we never find the possibility that the person is not in pain more or less 
probable. We properly speak of evidence and probability. Rather the reason 
is that probability is essentially a matter of already given knowledge. That 
is, to say that in such and such a case it is highly improbable that so-and-so 
is not in pain is to say that we have already found out in cases of this sort 
that people usually are in pain. 
Let us go back to the case of the man being hit by a truck. He clutches 
his arm and cries ouL Is he in pain? Well possibly he is not in pain. No 
countervailing condition such as a wink is present, but as yet we do not 
know anything about how such special factors affect the chances that a 
person is not in pain. So we cannot say as yet that it is highly improbable 
that he is not in pain on the grounds that no countervailing condition is 
present So we look more carefully and perhaps take in more of the 
circumstances and become more aware of his behavior. But he still may not 
be in pain. We still cannot say that it is highly improbable or only slightly 
probable that he is not in pain. No matter what case we begin with we 
cannot say that it is a case of someone in pain. It is possible that he is not 
in pain and we do not yet have the statistics for saying this possibility is 
highly improbable. 
To establish any case as a case of someone being in pain we need the 
requirement that there can be a reasonable doubt about his or her being in 
pain only if some countervailing condition is present. Now once we have 
such cases we can compare them with cases in which some person only 
seems to be but is not in pain. We can notice various differences in 
circumstance and behavior. We can correlate some items with cases of being 
in pain and other items with cases of not being in pain. We can use these 
correlations to work out rough probability estimates. 
But this procedure is possible only given that certain cases can be 
independently established as cases of other people being in pain. 
IV. Possibility 
Sometimes we think of the skeptical philosopher as merely reflecting on the 
verb 'to know' and then concluding that we must rule out every logical 
possibility of error. Perhaps some philosophers have said this. And perhaps 
it comes from a desire for mathematical certainty, which, in turn, comes 
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from an inspection of mathematics. But why should an inspection of 
mathematics lead to anything more than a desire for mathematical certainty 
in mathematics? How could the model of mathematical proof from axioms 
and definitions even seem to apply to cases in which we know that someone 
is in pain? It is even more absurd to want logical certainty. To want logical 
certainty is to want a proof that someone is in pain from definitions and the 
empty set of premises. To saddle S with such implausible desires would be 
to make her skepticism uninteresting. 
A modem-day skeptic is Peter Unger. Unger requires absolute certainty 
for knowledge. Unger puts forth the following simple argument, which he 
claims is "correct in all essentials" (Unger 1975, p. 95): 
(I) 	If someone knows something to be so, then it is all right for the person 
to be absolutely certain that it is so. 
(2) 	It is never all right for anyone to be absolutely certain that anything 
is so. 
Therefore, 
(3) Nobody ever knows that anything is so. 
Let me introduce a bit of terminology. If a possibility is such that its actually 
being the case would falsify the statement involved in the claim to know, then 
the possibility, relative to that claim, is a counter-possibility. Thus, for 
example, the pretending possibility is a counter-possibility relative to every 
claim to know that someone is in pain. The statements that X is in pain and 
that X is pretending to be in pain are incompatible. A counter-possibility is 
relevant to a claim only if it is a possibility that must be ruled out if the claim 
is allowed to stand. 
Peter Unger would regard each of the counter-possibilities S raised in 
my dialogue as being relevant to the claim that the man hit by a truck is in 
pain. Since the possibilities cannot be ruled out, he would conclude that M 
has no right to be absolutely certain that the man hit by the truck is in pain; 
using (1) above, he would conclude that M does not know that the man is 
in pain. 
Against Unger, I shall urge, following what is suggested by Pierce, 
Stevenson, and Austin, that when the pretending possibility, for example, is 
introduced into an ordinary case, and no special factor is present or appealed 
to, it is unreasonable to say we do not know. If some special factor is present 
then the doubt is localized to the given case. 
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What is this concept of pain? It is not merely the concept of a person 
being in pain. For the application of the concept of pretending to be in pain 
is an application of the concept of pain. 
Suppose Joe and Bill are at a zoo. Bill gets rather childish when he is at 
the zoo. There is an orangutan in an area Bill is standing before. Bill mimics 
him. He hunches over the rail and holds his head and makes low guttural 
I sounds. Joe glances in his direction. It looks as if Bill has collapsed over the 
I 
, 
rail, perhaps with a stomach cramp. groaning. Joe rushes over to Bill and 
asks him what's wrong. Bill straightens up with a blushing smile and says I he was just imitating the orangutan. 
I There is another way we may be mistaken. Joe says Bill is in pain when 
Bill is not in pain but is pretending to have stomach cramps. Here Joe is not I 
wrong in applying the concept of pain to Bill in the same sense in which he I was wrong in the orangutan case. There Joe's mistake was that of thinking
I 	 that Bill was groaning. Here, even if it turns out that Bill was pretending, 
Bill was groaning. Joe's application of the concept of pain to Bill may not 
be a true application but it is a proper application. Joe will say that BiII was 
not in pain but only pretending to be in pain. Joe will not withdraw his 
application of the concept of pain to Bill but will alter the mode of 
application. 
So when we describe the general concept of pain we must say that it 
includes the various concepts of being in pain, feigning pain, imitating pain, 
and so on. The two basic ideas involved in this concept are those of being in 
pain and only seeming to be in pain. 
Yet, when we are before a person displaying pain behavior, we do not 
say, "This person is in pain or in some way only seems to be in pain," We 
say this person is in pain. We apply the concept of pain in terms of one of 
its specific modalities. 
How can this be explained or justified? Suppose a person is pain 
behaving, Suppose also there is nothing untoward that we can observe about 
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the situation. That is, the person does not wink or smile; her cries are not 
exaggerated; she has no known suspicious motive or a suspect character; 
and so on. Then there is no reasonable doubt that the person is in pain. It 
may be the case that we have failed to notice something or that we fail to 
know something, but this does not alter the fact that we are justified in saying 
she is in pain. 
If the utterance of "So-and-so is in pain" is a claim to know then the 
question "How do you know?" is in order. If this question is in order in cases 
in which we say the person pain behaving in apparently normal 
circumstances (that is, where no countervailing conditions are present) is in 
pain, then we must view the behavior as evidence that the person is in pain. 
And then the question will arise as to what reason we have for saying the 
person is in pain on that evidence. 
When is the utterance of "So-and-so is in pain" a claim to know that 80­
and-so is in pain? It is clear that we cannot determine what sort of utterance 
is being used just from the utterance itself. Given different contexts the 
speaker might be guessing that so-and-so is in pain, or suggesting that so­
and-so is in pain, or informing someone that the person is in pain, and so 
forth. As is now well known, the status of a given utterance can be determined 
by a variety of factors coming either before or after the utterance itself. 
One good indication that the utterance is a claim to know is the 
occurrence of the question "How do you know?" When it is appropriate to 
fully accept this question consequent to having said, "So-and-so is in pain," 
the speaker has made a knowledge claim. 
I believe the correct methods for describing common knowledge and 
common knowing are the methods of Austin. The data to which we would 
have to appeal in giving our descriptions would be that of what we would 
say in fully described cases drawn from daily life. Whatever opinion we 
might have about the philosophical relevance of Austin's inquiries, it is 
unquestionable that they do produce adequate descriptions of what we would 
say we know and of when we would say we know and of all those ways in 
which we would ordinarily scrutinize and qualify our claims to know. 
I examine some cases in which I apply Austin's method of describing 
what we would say philosophy set aside. 
Case 1. You and I are standing before a person who is groaning, and 
holding her stomach. I remark of the fact she is in pain. You look at me and 
ask how do I know that. My response is "What do you mean? What makes 
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I ! can admit that it was a countervailing condition but neutralize its effect. 
/ 	 ("Yes, she did wink, but that doesn't mean anything. I know she would not 
pretend something like this. She just doesn't want us to worry. Look at how 
she is clenching her fists.") 
Case 2. Again we are before someone displaying pain behavior. You 
remark on the fact that his cries seem exaggerated. I reply, "Well he is in 
pain." You ask, "How do you know?" Again this question is perfectly in 
order. Again there are two ways I can support my claim. First, I may argue 
that his cries are not exaggerated. Second, I may argue that in other ways 
his behavior is authentic, thus neutralizing the countervailing aspect. 
Case 3. We are alone. You have not seen Smith and do not know that I 
have. I say that Smith was in pain. You ask me how [know. Again this 
question is perfectly in order. But now it amounts to "How did you come to 
be in a position to say that he is in pain?" Thus the answer to this question 
is to state the position I was in, for example, "I was in the room with him." 
Sometimes I will cite his pain behavior. But when I do this I am not basing 
I my claim on the fact that he behaved in those ways. Rather, I refer to his 
I behavior to show my position was a good one, for example, "I was in the 
I 
next room with him and heard him crying out and groaning." I 
I Case 4. Suppose you and I see somebody pain behaving. Nothing in this 
I situation is amiss, but you have been fooled recently a few times by people's 
pain behavior when there was no pain. Perhaps in those earlier 
circumstances the people were pretending, perhaps just imitating somebody 
else's behavior. So, when on this occasion I say that the person we see is in 
I pain, you are mistrustful and ask how I know. Once you explain yourself, I 
I accept the question. I then have to explain why this case differs from the I 
recent others that fooled you. Each of these cases features some disparity i 
i 	 between the claimant and questioner. In the first two cases the disparity turns 
i either on knowledge of or the assessment of some countervailing condition. ! 
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In the third case it turns on a difference of position. In the fourth case it turns 
on a difference of recent experience. 
It is not necessary that there be a second party. A person can think that 
so-and-so is in pain and then detect some countervailing condition and then 
either reject it or neutralize it and come to know the person is in pain. So we 
can generalize: the utterance "So-and-so is in pain" is a claim to know so­
and-so is in pain when that utterance is made with the knowledge that there 
is some reason to doubt the person is in pain. "Claiming to know" thus has 
an essential connection with "showing you know," for the claim to know is, 
in these cases, the claim that certain possibilities can either be ruled out or 
neutralized. 
Case 5. You and I are in the presence of someone pain behaving. There 
are no detectible countervailing conditions. Neither of us believes there are 
any. We each know that the other person does not believe there are any. Now 
I remark on how much pain she is in. I would not be telling you this or 
informing you of this. Your position is the same as mine. Now you ask: 
"How do you know she is in pain?" The question is altogether odd. We hear 
the words of the question. We understand these words. But these words in 
this question form in this situation are unintelligible. 
I shall put forth a theory that, I think, explains the oddness in case 5 and 
the lack of oddness in cases 1-4. 
When we said in case 5 that the person was in terrible pain we were 
simply applying the concept of pain to her in its primary form. The concept 
of pain includes a primary form, which is being in pain, and a secondary 
form, which is only seeming to be in pain either by way of pretense, or 
hallucinating, or hoaxing. and so on. In case 5 we were not claiming that we 
knew. We were not claiming that we had found this out (for example, by 
getting into a good position to see her), nor were we claiming that this is 
something we could show (for example, by neutralizing some countervailing 
condition). We were only showing that we took in the situation through our 
application of the concept of pain. The question "How do you know?" 
misrepresents the application of a concept. It represents it as a claim to know 
that the application is true. The question makes it look as if we had to do 
what we normally have to do in situations that involve countervailing 
conditions as in cases 1-4. There we have to give further reasons for thinking 
that the person really is in pain. But in fact this is not what we have to do, 
for all we have done is apply the concept of pain. 
'I 
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VI. Objection 
Now central to the theory is the claim that when we say a person is in pain 
in cases lacking countervailing conditions we are not informing or telling 
anyone that so-and-so is in pain, We are remarking on something. To this 
there is the reply that we have made this remark by stating a fact. What we 
really did was state this fact and our calling it a remark merely indicates how 
it fits into the context. The words themselves constituted a statement and 
this statement could fit into many different contexts as a remark or an 
explanation or a reporting, and so on. No matter how it fits, the statement is 
either true or false. Since the statement is either true or false, we either know 
or fail to know whether it is true or false. 
The theory also says that we do not make a knowledge claim in case 4. 
But, one might object, surely we do realize that the person is in pain, Surely 
this realization is not merely a belief or a guess or a hunch. This realization 
or taking it in that the person is in pain is knowing that the person is in pain. 
Just as a statement underlies a remark, so knowing underlies realizing and 
taking in. Just as stating that so-and-so is in pain fits into one context as a 
remark and into another context as a report, so knowing fits into one context 
as a realization and into another as a claim. 
VII. A Reply 
The perceptual situation in which we are consciously before a person pain 
behaving in a situation lacking countervailing conditions is the basic 
situation. According to the theory, this is the kind of situation in which we 
apply the concept of pain to a person. The objection says that it is the kind 
of situation in which we must know that a person is in pain. If so, then our 
most basic awareness of the reality of other people being in pain is a matter 
of knowing. 
But to think of us as knowing in these basic cases is to admit the rightness 
of the question "How do you know?" And then we should be able to provide 
grounds for our claims and rule out possibilities that might show that our 
claims are incorrect. If the question "How do you know?" is in order, then 
the only possible answer to it is that I know the person is in pain because he 
or she is displaying pain behavior. 
One might still think there is arguably still a serious question about how 
we know that somebody's in pain. The colloquial question-"How do you 
